Synthetic biology

 Synthetic biology

Introduction

• COVID-19 has made it clear that our traditional imagination of national security is no longer credible. 

• The preparedness of nation states and global security arrangements were insufficient in dealing with 

the crisis. 

• The growth of exponential technologies such as synthetic biology, artificial intelligence and 

nanotechnology is bound to change the theory and practice of national security.

• COVID-19 has further highlighted the biosecurity concerns of synthetic biology. 

What is Synthetic Biology

• Synthetic biology is a revolutionary technology which can help us manipulate biological organisms 

and proces

ses for human betterment, especially in treating diseases, by re-engineering cells.

Security Implications

• The exponential technologies have unforeseen national and global security implications. 

• In 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense categorised synthetic biology as one of the six ‘disruptive 

basic research areas’.

• There are many risks associated with the technology which must be addressed before it becomes 

widely accessible. 

• There is the possibility of deliberate misuse.

Accidental leaks of experimental pathogens are another concern. 

• There has been very little focus on threats emanating from biological sources.

• A well-planned attack using highly infectious pathogens synthetically engineered in a lab could be 

disastrous.

Concerns / Challenges

• Unlike the nuclear domain, the fields of synthetic biology are not regulated internationally despite 

growing military interest in synthetic biology applications and their potential misuse.

• Very little has been done by the international community about ‘weapon of mass destruction’ 

(WMD) capability of bio-weapons.

• When it comes to bio-weapons, all we have is the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 

(BTWC) of 1972 with no implementing body. 

• The outcomes of bio-defence research could potentially be used to create bio-weapons.

India’s Position

• India is at a disadvantaged position compared to the more developed countries due to

o poor disease surveillance, 

o insufficient coordination among various government departments dealing with biosecurity 

issues, and 

o The current state of the healthcare system.

• India has multiple institutions dealing with biosafety and biosecurity threats but there is no 

coordination among them. 

• Implementation of biosafety guidelines is the responsibility of the Science and Technology Ministry 

and the Environment Ministry. 

• However, labs dealing with biological research are set up under the Indian Council of Medical 

Research and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, which are under the Ministries of Health 

and Agriculture, respectively.

• The multiplicity of bodies and ministers makes coordination difficult.

• Given the rising risk of diseases of zoonotic origin, the traditional ministry-wise separation might 

not be useful. 

• An important question is whether India, with its porous borders, is prepared for defending against 

pathogens or dangerous biological organisms or agents arriving from abroad. 

• COVID-19 should serve as a wake-up call.

Way Forward

• There is a need to carefully review, especially in the wake of the pandemic, the biosecurity systems 

in place where such technologies are in use.

• Pandemics have also highlighted that the traditional distinction at the international institutional level 

between biological weapons and diseases may not be useful anymore. 

• There needs to be more conversation between health specialists and bio-weapons/defence 

specialists.

• There is a need to address the thin line between biotechnology research and bio-weapons research, 

and consider international measures for monitoring and verification.

• Best practices and standards must be woven into operational biological protocols to combat these